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Abstract—A unified electronic health record (EHR) has 
potentially immeasurable benefits to society, and the current 
healthcare industry drive to create a single EHR reflects this. 
However, adoption is slow due to two major factors: the 
disparate nature of data storage facilities of current healthcare 
systems, and the security ramifications of accessing, using, and 
potential misuse of that data. To attempt to address these issues 
this paper presents the VANGUARD (Virtual ANonymisation 
Grid for Unified Access of Remote Data) system which supports 
adaptive security-oriented linkage of distributed clinical data-sets 
to support a variety of virtual EHRs avoiding the need for a 
single schematic standard and the natural concerns of data 
owners and other stakeholders on data access and usage. 
VANGUARD has been designed explicitly with security in mind 
and supports clear delineation of roles for data linkage and 
usage. 
Keywords - privacy-preserving computing; system security; 
privacy engineering 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The healthcare industry drive to create a single unified 
electronic health record (EHR) is an inevitable consequence of 
the progress of the digital age. The benefits that it stands to 
bring to society are immeasurable: immediate, real-time access 
to patient histories, conditions, treatments will save many lives 
in those critical situations where split-second decisions can 
have a major impact on the medical outcome. 
As with other communities that are attempting to create a 
unified description of application domain data, a number of 
standards have been posited and agreed upon. Some examples 
in the health domain are HL7 [1], OpenEHR [2] and SNOMED 
CT [3] – which are often intended as complementary entities 
(HL7 is a messaging protocol for exchanging health data, 
OpenEHR is the aggregation of that health data per-person, and 
SNOMED CT is a large-scale clinical dictionary). 
Unfortunately, in practice a lot of these standards have 
significant overlap and, driven by different open-source bodies, 
their development is not necessarily commensurate. 
 There are also a number of commercial vendors attempting 
to move into the space of unified health-care system support. 
The largest protagonists in this field include Google Health [4] 
and Microsoft HealthVault [5] who provide unified health 
record services to the general public (though currently still at 
prototype stage). There is also an open source version – Indivo 
[6] – which attempts to replicate the commercial functions of 
these vendors for free, but puts the emphasis on patient privacy 
and ownership of their own records. 
The design and publication of standards is one thing, but 
actually implementing them in systems that will be used by 
ground-level healthcare staff is quite another. The experience 
of program development within the healthcare field has shown 
that there is a major disconnect between the standards 
promoted and publicized by management, and the systems in 
use in individual hospitals and practices. Generally, it is 
believed that this disconnect exists because of a lack of single-
tier management structure within the healthcare community. 
The community itself is broadly structured as a patchwork of 
different institutions – either a variety of privately run 
commercial enterprises (such as the US model), or a 
combination of private companies and national health boards 
(as in the UK). Such fragmentation makes it difficult to direct 
technological strategy for healthcare on a national level. 
Certainly it appears that private companies with greater capital 
reserves are more able to adopt the standards mentioned 
previously but, as capital is unevenly distributed in society, this 
tends to only account for a privileged minority of any given 
population. 
Clearly, for unified data standards to become a reality that 
can be applied to all patients currently in the healthcare system 
of any country, there is a strong need to interface with the 
patchwork of IT systems and data that has grown up as a result 
of such complex bureaucracy. Even if a single unified standard 
is adopted, there is sufficient legacy data and systems already 
in existence providing healthcare, that unifying standards must 
accommodate this legacy and deal with the transition to new 
unified standards and associated systems.  
Complexity of data and systems is not the only issue with 
regard to the adoption of new standards however. Another 
development of the digital age – and one that people are often 
fearful of because of the unknown factors involved – is that of 
data security. The issues surrounding not just who can see your 
data, but what data is important, and how it can be used to 
compromise individuals, are very much in the public 
consciousness. A good example of this is the furore 
surrounding the Connecting for Health initiative [7] – an 
attempt to unify healthcare systems throughout the UK – which 
has so far met with more headlines than success. A major 
source of those headlines is the insufficient effort that has been 
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put into working out the nuances of the security of this national 
system. Open access databases with coarse granularity, has led 
to widespread fear that the average patient record – and all the 
sensitive data therein – would be accessible by even the most 
junior of hospital staff.  
With these concerns in mind, the National e-Science Centre 
(NeSC – www.nesc.ac.uk) has embarked on several projects 
involving access to and usage of clinical data in the healthcare 
domain using a novel system known as VANGUARD (Virtual 
ANonymisation Grid for Unified Access of Remote Data). 
VANGUARD attempts to address the issues of remote data 
linkage and security at a community defined peer-to-peer level. 
The methods and implementation involved allow relationships 
between systems to be established that add value to the patient 
record – which it did not have before the linkage – but also 
have the security of that relationship designed into the 
architecture. Critically, this technology does not preclude or 
position itself as an alternative to healthcare data standards that 
may be adopted in the future, but attempts to facilitate that 
adoption. VANGUARD has been designed from the outset to 
be a scalable technology, allowing many relationships to be 
built into networks of secure, linked data-sets “greater than the 
sum of their parts”. 
The technical basis of VANGUARD is the fine-grained 
layering of encryption on all data that is passed between parties 
through mediating agents, which have knowledge of data 
structures (data models/schema) but not necessarily of the 
actual data itself. With the requirements of limited visibility 
designed into the system from the beginning, data can be 
shared accurately and securely between the participating 
institutions without actually disclosing identifying information 
to anyone or any software component. We regard this system 
as supporting privacy by design. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the healthcare context that VANGUARD has been 
developed in, along with the predominant data-sets in use in 
the UK. Section 3 covers the design and implementation of 
VANGUARD to date in the Virtual Organisations for Trials 
and Epidemiological Studies (VOTES) project. Finally, section 
4 describes the outstanding issues in developing VANGUARD 
to become a viable health data product, along with the legal 
and security ramifications of the extended functionality 
required. 
II. HEALTHCARE CONTEXT 
The main requirements associated with healthcare data 
sharing discussed above were arrived at through the work 
conducted as part of the 3.5 year VOTES project [8].  
A. VOTES 
VOTES was a £2.8m initiative funded by the UK Medical 
Research Council (MRC), which attempted to bring e-Science 
and the power of building data grids to the clinical community 
for a variety of purposes, such as patient recruitment, enhanced 
data collection, and improved clinical trial management. The 
project began in October 2005 and recently completed in 
March 2009.  The remit of the project was grand in scale and 
required the collation and understanding of many of the major 
healthcare data-sets and systems in use throughout Scotland 
and England. In Scotland these data sets and systems included: 
• The Scottish Morbidity Records (SMR) [9] – which 
comprise a comprehensive record of inpatients, 
outpatients, cancer registration, mental health and 
psychosis, and death records throughout hospitals and 
practices in Scotland. The records go back several 
decades and are an authoritative source of a wealth of 
clinical information across Scotland. These data sets 
are also augmented and linked with census data 
available from the General Register Office (GRO) in 
Edinburgh. 
• GPASS [10] - an administrative system used by 85% 
of general practitioners in Scotland. GPASS is a 
facility for managing all aspects of primary care patient 
data. GPASS also supports uploading of patient 
records to secondary care systems, e.g. to hospitals for 
further treatments and consultant referrals. 
• SCI Store [11] – a central repository used by many 
hospitals across Scotland that is designed to manage all 
hospital data from inpatients and outpatients to lab 
data. SCI Store supports interfaces for periodic uploads 
of primary care patient data (from applications such as 
GPASS). 
In England the main data-sets and systems encountered 
were: 
• MIQUEST [12] - provides standard interfaces to be 
used by individual general practices across the 
country, so that central facilitators can manually 
upload and transfer data between nodes, and perform 
analysis over a largely standard data-set. 
• General Practice Research Database (GPRD) [13] – 
one of the world’s largest computerized databases of 
anonymised patient data from general practice. It 
comprises demographic, treatment, event, referral and 
outcome information. 
• UK Biobank [14] – a long-term study investigating 
genetic predisposition and environmental exposure to 
the development of disease, by collecting data from 
500,000 volunteers aged between 40 and 69. During 
the course of the trial disease events, drug 
prescriptions and deaths are all recorded. 
 
As the VOTES project developed it became apparent that 
there is a greater degree of fragmentation and lower data 
quality in the systems and data used in England than of those in 
Scotland. This is partly a result of the priorities of the recently 
devolved parliament in Scotland, and also as a result of the 
high proportion of poor living conditions in Scottish urban 
areas (compared to England), which has required a highly 
proactive public healthcare campaign over the past decade. 
The technical result of this higher quality data is a more 
complete and reliable data-set, referenced through a single 
index identifier – the Community Health Index (CHI number). 
A similar identifier exists in English healthcare databases – the 
NHS number – but this was often found to have patchier 
coverage, and was not necessarily unique beyond the realms of 
regional health boards.  
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A second consequence of this discrepancy in quality was 
the fact that the major healthcare data providers had direct 
involvement with VOTES whilst in England, the engagement 
and contributions were more difficult to source.  
Despite this however, it should be noted that the overall 
state of healthcare data in Scotland is still far from complete 
and valid. The major vendor, SCI Store – an allegedly 
“standard” repository for nationwide secondary care (hospital 
data) and GPASS data – was reported to have 18 slightly 
different schema descriptions: one for each Scottish health 
board. Similarly, CHI numbers – though more reliable than 
their English counterparts – are still notoriously patchy in 
coverage (some residents have none, some have two, etc.) It is 
also the case that many hospitals and practices simply continue 
to use paper records, in reaction to the relatively short-sighted 
IT strategies implemented from above. 
In terms of technology to integrate with and use healthcare 
data, the VOTES project developed and tested many systems 
and interfaces [15]. After trialing of several Grid solutions for 
data access and management, and integration with security 
technologies it was agreed that the best way to proceed was to 
use an in-house authorization system, which could be 
configured for use by the researchers and clinicians in VOTES. 
The results of the technology investigation in VOTES, 
described in [15], were mixed at best. However, towards the 
end of the project the consolidation of these efforts and early 
prototype experiences resulted in the specification and 
implementation of the VANGUARD system. At the heart of 
VANGUARD is flexible data linkage (able to bring together 
many distributed parties) and anonymisation with owner-led 
security (through dynamically reduced data-sets based on 
stakeholder privilege).  Several proof of concept systems 
applying VANGUARD have been demonstrated with major 
new projects also exploiting the privacy by design approach. 
B. SHIP and Avert-IT 
Two projects where the VANGUARD technology will be 
used with immediate effect are the Scottish Health Informatics 
Platform for Research (SHIP – www.scot-hip.org.uk) and the 
Advance Prediction of Adverse Hypotensive Events (Avert-IT) 
project (www.avert-it.org). The former is a three-year project 
to establish a research platform upon which a definitive 
electronic patient record for Scotland can be built. The data-set 
over which the linkage will occur are those Scottish patient 
records systems already identified through the VOTES project. 
Key to this is the use of the CHI number as the referencing 
index. SHIP has just started in April 2009, with technical 
papers due for the middle of the year. 
 The latter, Avert-IT, is a project to develop a “prediction 
engine” that will allow healthcare professionals to be alerted to 
imminent hypotensive events in brain trauma patients. Avert-IT 
is a European collaboration and again, the data-set over which 
the analysis and development will occur is linked with a single 
reference index, established from a previous data collection 
project – Brain-IT (http://www.brainit.org) – and linked at a 
local level for each participating site (more technical details of 
this project, which has been running for just over a year, can be 
found in [16]). 
Both of these projects require the secure transmission and 
linkage of data between two parties through mediating agents, 
with the assumption that only limited trust exists between data 
providers, mediators and the end users of that data.  
C. Global Datasets 
The idea of providing a unified electronic health record is a 
globally accepted one, and as such, the authors have attempted 
to investigate the availability of equivalent data-sets in North 
America, and compare the issues to those in the UK. From 
collaboration with the caBIG (cancer Biomedical Informatics 
Grid) project [17], run by the US National Cancer Institute, the 
situation appears to be that of myriad data-sets all idiosyncratic 
to the major health insurance providers in the country. In 
Canada, there appears to be a collection of more canonical data 
sets (CCRS, DAD, HCD, etc) [18], managed and disseminated 
by the Canadian Institute for Health Information. It is tempting 
to assume that this discrepancy between the two countries is a 
function of the difference in provision of social healthcare – the 
US notable for being the only developed nation in the world to 
lack such an infrastructure. This also raises a question of the 
financial motivation for attempting to unify datasets (which is 
discussed in section 4 of this paper). 
III. VANGUARD - PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
In designing the VANGUARD system there were several 
requirements that the end customer (the UK Biobank team) 
specified as being paramount. These included the need for 
firewalls to remain closed to incoming traffic, hence the need 
for a “pull” model of communication for all component 
interactions with data providers and their systems. Furthermore 
from a security standpoint, a major requirement was that all 
data in transit, at rest, and outside RAM memory would have to 
use strong encryption to avoid potential eavesdropping by 
malicious third parties. 
From the point of view of application validity, the major 
requirements were robustness in the event of component 
failures anywhere in the system; the use of a simple and 
intuitive user interface (UI), and the avoidance of proprietary 
platforms and code so that the application would have a long 
lifetime. 
With these considerations in mind the following 
specification for the VANGUARD application was proposed. 
A. Design 
The main components and their functions for 
VANGUARD application are viewers, agents, guardians and 
bankers: 
• Viewers are used to access potentially remote data 
sets (typically this is associated with a specific 
clinical research study that has been approved by 
an independent ethics body). 
• Guardians protect the data resources being 
provided to the virtual organization. 
• Agents mediate the exchange between the 
guardian and the viewer.  
332
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. Downloaded on November 4, 2009 at 05:17 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
• Bankers maintain a record of all transactions that 
have taken place and limit resource data 
exchanges based on accountability information. 
(Though the banker will be an important 
component, its specification has yet to be outlined 
and as such, will not be expanded upon in this 
paper.) 
B. Agreements and Threat Models 
The overall agreement is assumed to be between the 
viewer and the guardian, so the agent is an untrusted entity 
that merely facilitates the joining of data requests to results. 
The agent can see the data headers and is aware of the 
guardian’s schema but cannot see the data values within. 
Joining is performed on encrypted data points hence it is 
possible to join without knowing the underlying values 
themselves. Through the use of a single overall guardian key, 
the integrity of the data returned can be secured for the viewer. 
This also protects the user from establishing the audit trail of 
which data has come from which guardian. Only the agent has 
this knowledge, which it can then use to facilitate the banking 
component.  
The major threats that this system attempts to protect 
against are as follows: 
• Guardian impersonation (man in the middle) 
• Unauthorised users (authorizing privilege levels 
appropriately) 
• Decoding encrypted data payloads (use of asymmetric 
encryption on the query-specific hash can protect 
against this). This would potentially protect against 
users eavesdropping on agent-guardian interactions 
and decoding the method to identify what the sub-
query is. 
• Integrity of payload between guardian and viewer (use 
of an overall guardian key) 
• Anonymity of payload between guardian and viewer 













Figure 1: architecture diagram highlighting the messages passing 
between the VANGUARD components. 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the process. The convention of 
messages passed is encapsulating brackets for encryption, and 
trailing subscripts for signatures. The “x” represents a single 
user request/process. The subscript numbers represent where 
the query and results divide into sections.  
The various process stages are as follows: 
• The user selects a study through a viewer; 
• The user is presented with data fields that can be 
queried in that study which have a visibility of 
either open, hashed or closed; 
• The user makes a selection through the viewer and 
the request is sent along with the user’s public key 
to the agent. The request is signed with the 
viewer’s private key and encrypted with the 
agent’s public key: 
o PKA (QX, PKUX)PKV 
• The agent decrypts the request. 
• The agent creates a federated query execution plan 
based upon the request received and divides the 
request into components to be forwarded to the 
relevant guardians (QX1, QX2, etc.) 
• The agent also generates a unique query-specific 
hash to be attached to the guardian requests 
(HAX). 
• The agent puts all this information into the 
relevant guardian storage mechanism, signed by 
the agent’s private key and encrypted with the 
guardian’s public key: 
o PKG1 (QX1, PKUX, HAX)PKA  
• The guardians periodically check for requests 
(queries) they should respond to; 
• The guardian pulls requests that they should act 
upon;  
• The guardian decrypts and makes a locally defined 
authorization decision on the query, and when 
satisfied that it meets all local policy criteria on 
data access and usage, executes the query. 
• The guardian returns the encrypted results (using 
the user’s public key PKUX) to the agent, signing 
it with its own private key (for the agent), the 
overall guardian signature key (for the viewer), 
and encrypting it with the agent’s public key. 
o PKA (PKUX (RX1), HAX)PKG1 
• The agent decrypts the individual package and 
joins with other components of HAX that have 
been returned from the other guardians. We note 
that the agent is only able to see and join the 
hashed data set since the remaining data is 
encrypted with the user’s public key. Once joining 
has taken place (the assumed process is a non-
duplicated inner join, though this would be subject 
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to the parties’ agreement), the information on how 
the join was made is removed thereby removing 
the possibility for further direct joining. 
• The agent returns the linked and anonymised 
results to the viewer, signed with the agent’s 
private key and encrypted using the viewer’s 
public key. 
o PKV (PKUX (RX))PKA 
• The viewer decrypts the results data, while the 
user is subsequently able to decrypt the full, linked 
and anonymised result set using their own private 
key, and checks it’s integrity using the overall 
guardian public key. 
The ontology used for each participating site is maintained 
by the agent, updated by schema request updates from the 
guardians at regular intervals. The standardized representations 
of these parameters are presented to the user, with a fine-
grained authorization layer between the agent and viewer to 
evaluate how the user sees the possible data points. The 
possible states are: 
• Open – the data is available to this user. 
• Hashed – the data is available in anonymised 
form to this user, and can therefore be used for 
statistical counting and aggregated information. 
• Closed – the data is not available to this user but 
can still be used by the agent for joining (the 
relevant data points are stripped away before the 
result set is returned to the viewer). 
Through this combination of layered encryption, signature 
and restricted authorization of standardized ontology 
mappings, the VANGUARD system effectively allows a 
unified federation of distributed data, whilst maintaining the 
strict agreement between the requesting user and the resource 
guardian. 
C. Implementation 
Version 1.0 of VANGUARD was developed to make use of 
the interface already used by the VOTES project. As such, the 
application is currently accessed using a GridSphere portal 
through a web browser. The resources behind the infrastructure 
are JDBC-enabled databases from several of the VOTES 
centres, and the encryption is performed using digitally-signed 
X.509 certificates. 
The component communication is implemented using Axis2 
web services, which effectively performs the Agent role. The 
Viewer and Guardian modules are implemented at the 
application level beneath the user-facing portal interface. The 
calls between the Viewer/Guardian and the Agent are as 
follows: 
• Viewer to Agent:  
o submitQuery (pku, query)  
o downloadResults (userID, queryID) 
• Guardian to Agent: 
o downloadRequests () 
o uploadResult (queryUserID, jobID, 
queryData) 
The ontology mapping is currently accessed through the 
application layer of all participating components (Viewer, 
Guardian and Agent). The mapping is constructed using a 
relational PostgreSQL database at each site, updated using 
SQL scripts whenever a new source is added or a site’s 
policy is updated. However, investigations are underway to 
establish whether using XML and its ability to process semi-
structured data-sets would provide more advantage in 












Figure 2: Example shot of viewer input screen, including 
parameter label, conditions, and availability (open, hashed, 
closed). 
Identity and use of public key infrastructures is managed 
using Shibboleth [19], a single sign-on (SSO) technology that 
provides access to distributed resources throughout a pre-
existing federation, but authenticated at local institutions. This 
hides a lot of complexity involved in PKI management from 
the end users and allows an established authority to maintain 
the identity assertion component of the system. 
IV. EXTENDING USABILITY 
The development of VANGUARD so far has focused on 
the security requirements inherent in unifying healthcare data, 
and attempting to address those requirements at the application 
design stage. However, in order for the application to be widely 
adopted, and to give it a functionality that truly addresses the 
needs of the community – whilst maintaining security – there 
are a number of additional issues, which currently still need to 
be addressed, and are not yet implemented. 
A. Beyond the CHI 
In the first instance, VANGUARD works across single 
data domains because the presence of a single unified index is 
assumed. In Scotland this is the CHI number; in England the 
NHS number. For a country such as the UK – made up of 
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several nation states (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland), each with differing levels of self-governance – it is 
possible to maintain a record of how these indexes relate to 
each other (though only through simple allocation matching, 
rather than any complex analytical relationship). 
In this case, where movement between various health 
domains is politically easy, it is desirable to maintain this 
index relationship from a primary care standpoint – allowing 
effective treatment by knowing the patient’s medical history, 
no matter where in the country that history has been built up. 
On a global scale, the issue of maintaining such inter-
domain relationships would appear to be less important. Most 
health data joining is not primarily to track individual patients, 
but to aggregate overall statistical health trends. Typically this 
information is reported per-country, and with migration being 
generally hard to achieve, knowing individual patient histories 
becomes an issue internal to the country involved. 
It should also be noted though, that most countries have a 
political structure which maintains a relationship between 
regional and federal governance. In a country such as the 
United States, the issue of matching domain index 
relationships becomes incredibly complex, as these are based 
on the patient’s presence within a particular healthcare 
insurance provider, and such data is not necessarily 
forthcoming. The issue of only having access to private 
health-care brings up the financial value of such data. Closely 
aligned to concerns on privacy of data linkage, there is 
potentially a strong business driver against such linkage and 
aggregation of health data. Whether this is to the benefit of the 
wider population depends on the corporate responsibility of 
the healthcare insurers involved. 
B. Secondary Matching 
A further development in the integration of distributed 
healthcare records would be to remove the dependence on a 
single primary index discussed above. The first step in doing 
this is to match patients on criteria other than their identifying 
index. An example would be to identify a condition, within a 
specific postcode – in many cases this would return a 
sufficiently small number of records to allow identification. 
Combined with a probabilistic calculator of the match 
confidence and it would be possible to use a few key 
indicators to identify individuals. 
The security and privacy ramifications of this however, are 
manifold. Such cases are examples of statistical inference, 
which is a notoriously difficult process to protect against, if 
used by malefactors. This type of matching would also be of 
great interest to all governments looking to more efficiently 
track their citizens as part of the post-9/11 drive to prevent 
terrorism. The short jump from such technology falling into 
the hands of governments intent on implementing repressive 
regimes is not inconceivable. 
Therefore, the identification of what data should be 
available is a mandatory procedure, and has given rise to 
groups such as the open source Indivo project, which places 
the emphasis on patient ownership of data and has a 
philosophy of releasing data only if absolutely necessary to the 
provision of care. 
C. Ontology 
Key to the technical development of VANGUARD is the 
existence of a mapping schema that describes the individual 
datasets and matches them to the peer datasets. This already 
exists in the current implementation, but in a static format held 
in databases by both the Viewer/Guardian and the Agent. 
The required development here is a separate module that 
can automatically inspect a new dataset, translate that into an 
XML document for use in VANGUARD (along with the 
privacy level of each parameter), upload that document to the 
application and have it published to the rest of the components 
a short time afterwards. 
Central to the success of VANGUARD is that no single 
standard is adopted, but these ontologies simply exist on a 
peer-to-peer basis. However, the ability to maintain a structure 
such as this requires a separate module in itself, which will 
need to manage the inherent performance issues when the 
structure reaches a large scale. 
D. Performance/ Scalability 
Maintenance of the ontology structure is one area affected 
by performance issues, but the strong security provided by 
VANGUARD is of potentially greater importance in this 
regard. Multiple encryption calls have a cost in performance, 
which will only increase as the number of peer-to-peer calls 
increase. A possible technical solution to this would be the 
ability to outsource the encryption action to a component of 
the system residing on (or with access to) a more powerful 
hardware component. However, it does not solve the resulting 
bandwidth required by inflated communication calls, and it 
also adds an additional layer of complexity (which is against 
the tenets of secure application design). 
Though this is an issue that should be solved before 
adoption, there is a strong argument to suggest that in the 
immediate term it is not a major problem, given the 
asynchronous batch processing nature of the VANGUARD 
system. As such, the drive to increase performance will not 
impact directly on the user experience of VANGUARD. 
E. User Interface 
This is not a new problem, but key to software adoption is 
the experience of the user – is the interface and operation 
intuitive and easy to follow? Is there a minimum of new 
processes to learn? Does it follow the businesses processes 
that the user is already used to? All these concerns are solved 
by carrying out good requirement capture and adhering to 
these throughout the development cycle. 
A key additional question in the health domain is often 
whether to stay with legacy interfaces or not. The driver tends 
to be that the learning process will be so much quicker if the 
program operates in the same way as the tools that were 
previously used. However, the competing concern is that the 
design of legacy applications is often so poor that much 
compromise in terms of security and efficiency has to be 
made. 
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Also important in the UI regard is the management of 
complex PKI credentials. Shibboleth and related federated 
technologies are relatively established methods of addressing 
this, though their widespread adoption is yet to be total. 
F. Legal and Social Ramifications 
A finding of the VOTES project was that irrespective of 
the technical capabilities of the system implemented, an over-
riding agreement between the parties involved that is signed 
and understood a priori is essential. This is particularly 
important when dealing with the potential ramifications of 
security breaches or data protection violations. Within these 
agreements it must be made explicitly clear who has what 
privileges; who is able to see what data sets; where potential 
conflicts of interest exist and how to make efforts to prevent 
system abuse. 
Also for consideration is the potentially great impact that a 
technology such as VANGUARD can have socially. Such a 
system would be of interest to government agencies and 
malefactors alike, particularly if the ability to perform 
secondary matching with high accuracy were achieved. Such 
considerations are part of the “privacy erosion” issue, which 
legislation such as Title II of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), attempts to address. 
G. Extended Implementation 
The expression and implementation of these additional 
issues will be investigated as part of the SHIP project 
throughout the coming year. In the first instance, secondary 
matching will be implemented using data points other than the 
central index. The provision of more sophisticated ontology 
development will follow, along with investigations into the 
performance impact on simulated production systems. 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have presented a schematic for the 
VANGUARD system, in an attempt to address the issues of 
security in linking healthcare data sets, from ground-level 
design. The design and architecture has followed a set of 
requirements provided by major customers in the sector, and 
has been implemented in a test environment. The additional 
considerations for turning VANGUARD into a viable 
production system available for widespread adoption have 
been discussed, along with the legal and social implications 
and impact on patient privacy. Future work in the context of 
the SHIP project will develop these ideas and provide further 
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